Date of Publication :17th August 2017
Abstract: Crypto circuits can be attacked by third parties using differential power analysis (DPA), which uses power consumption dependence on data being processed to reveal critical information. To protect security devices against this issue, differential logic styles with (almost) constant power dissipation are widely used. However, to use such circuits effectively for secure applications it is necessary to eliminate any energy-secure flaw in security in the shape of memory effects that could leak information. This paper proposes a design methodology to improve pull-down logic configuration for secure differential gates by redistributing the charge stored in internal nodes and thus, removing memory effects that represent a significant threat to security. To evaluate the methodology, it was applied to the design of AND/NAND and XOR/XNOR gates in a 90 nm technology, adopting the Sense amplifier based logic (SABL) style for the pull-up network. Sbox 8 can be implemented using these circuits for the security purpose.
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